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ABSTRACT  
The Purpose of Party Manifestos:  
Relating Party Function and Strategy in Party Manifestos. (April 2014) 
 
Jacqueline Malinda Groves 
Department of Political Science 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Robert Harmel 
Department of Political Science  
 
This paper is an effort to determine the purposes of party manifestos (aka platforms), and more 
specifically how a party’s experience in governance determines the strategies they pursue, 
through the structure of their manifesto, to achieve their party goals. This is an important issue in 
the field of political science research because, while there have been mass amounts of research 
dedicated to understanding the contents of party manifestos, there has been very little research 
concerned with why parties produce manifestos. This paper intends to determine the amount of 
variation there is among party platforms to the extent to which the party is using the document to 
give an overview of their entire program for running the government, including all aspects of 
government policy, or to shore up their support base by focusing on a few key issues. By 
determining if there is a relationship between a party’s experience in government and the 
strategy they pursue in writing their manifesto, this study hopes to determine why parties focus 
on the issues they do, and how party strategies, exemplified in manifesto structure, indicate the 
purpose that party manifestos may serve.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Though the field of political parties research has spent much effort investigating explanations for 
varying content, and changes in content of party manifestos, there has been very little study of 
cross-national and cross-party variance in why parties develop manifestos and how they are 
written and subsequently adopted. In other words, until recently, political science research in the 
field of party manifestos has focused “primarily on why parties choose the positions they 
do…and whether they fulfill their pledges once in office” (Harmel 23). Missing in this research 
are questions such as: why do parties create manifestos in the first place? And what purpose does 
the manifesto serve for the party?  
 
In “The How’s and Why’s of Party Manifestos” (2011), Harmel divides literature concerning the 
purposes of manifestos into eight categories; the manifesto as direct appeal to voters, as a means 
of controlling elected officials, as a draft of a legal program, for the indirect mobilization of 
voters thru interest groups and through the media, for rewarding and arming the activists, for 
resolving internal disputes and presenting an image of unity, as a tool in building and running 
coalition governments, and lastly, as a document with multiple purposes. Harmel uses these 
purposes hypothesized by political party theorists such as Kavanagh (1981), Bara (2005), 
Reinhart and Victor (2009), and Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), etc. to suggest that manifesto 
“purpose impacts process” and that both impact content (Harmel 2011). Harmel’s “The How’s 
and Why’s of Party Manifestos” is an introduction to theory building concerning the relation of 
party manifestos purpose to its process and its content. This study attempts to link party’s 
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government experiences to the purpose, and hence strategy, for which the party develops its 
manifesto contents. Specifically concerning the content of a party’s manifesto, “variance on the 
number of pledges may reflect different uses to which parties put their platforms, differences in 
the systems within which they operate, or differences in party characteristics such as ideology” 
(Harmel 2011). Harmel (2011) suggests that “when it is the parliamentary organization that holds 
the majority of power, it might be expected that- to the degree the parliamentary organization can 
control such content- the manifesto will be more vague and general regarding any policy 
commitments, thus maximizing freedom of action for the parliamentary group” and therefore 
focusing on the electorate more than on the membership (Harmel 2011). Furthermore, Harmel 
states that in the case of a party not currently in government “the document would likely be 
influenced by the interests of the membership” and thus the focus would be more concerned with 
constraining the politics of the party in government and less concerned with pleasing and 
enticing the electorate (Harmel 2011). Therefore, keeping these statements in mind, we propose 
that a party’s experience vis-à-vis government acts as a determinant of the party’s function and 
thus impacts the strategies they pursue in writing their manifesto. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORY 
 
Spatial Model and Salience Theory of party competition 
In order to research how political parties determine the content of their manifesto, we must first 
look at what parties believe to be the purpose of their manifesto. According the theory of party 
competition, political parties exist in contest with one another to achieve their goals. A 
competitive party is defined by Robertson (1976) as “one which (a) is not in permanent 
opposition or permanent office; and (b) accepts the legitimacy of its major opponent and of the 
constitutional system” (Robertson 1976). This definition of competitive parties subsumes that 
future election results are unknown to the party and that, if defeated, the party will resign from 
office and not attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the successor.  
 
To understand why parties pursue the political strategies they do, one must first be familiar with 
Anthony Downs Economic Theory of Democracy (1957). Regarded as the classical conception of 
party competition, Downs’ theory holds that all political parties have, as at least one of their 
goals, gaining electoral office, and that a party’s ideologies develop out of this goals. These 
ideologies are expressed through issue positions in party manifestos, which are “the only 
statement of policy made with authority on behalf of the whole party” (Klingeman, Hoferbert, & 
Budge 1994). In a competitive party system, political parties must offer solutions to social 
problems, or issue positions, via their election manifestos. It is up to the electorate to decide 
which problems and solutions, i.e. issue positions, they would like to see implemented. 
According to Downs, the party program acts as a cheat sheet to the uninformed voter, allowing 
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the voter to weigh individual issues and then asses which party’s issue positions align best with 
the voters own beliefs. Downs’ theory of party competition posits that parties form their sets of 
positions to seek the maximum number of supporters. Indeed Downs views parties as vote 
maximizers who’s manifestos are purposed to “shore up current votes and lure additional voters 
to the party” (Harmel 2011).  
 
In an analysis of party competition, Klingeman, Hofferbert and Budge (1994) adopt Robertson’s 
(1976) modifications to Downs’s spatial model of party competition, called salience theory. 
Downs’s spatial model holds that once a party has gained electoral office, they have a mandate to 
carry through the policies that had attracted either the majority or plurality of votes. This model 
rests on the assumption that parties have policy flexibility that enables them to place themselves 
on any part of the left-right policy continuum. However, Robertson’s salience theory 
acknowledges that parties are constricted by the enduring ideological stances upon which they 
were founded. These issues “are packaged by ideology, yielding a history of particular actions in 
government and enduring association with certain groups of supporters” (Klingeman, Hoferbert 
& Budge 1994). Thus, avoiding renouncing previous policy positions and alienating traditional 
support groups, political parties will instead emphasize or de-emphasize issues in their programs. 
In order to maximize votes, parties must seek the distribution of issues that gives the best return 
in votes over all sections of the population. The more evenly issues are distributed among the 
major population groups, the higher return in votes. Therefore, when a political party perceives 
an election to be competitive, then they will pursue a distribution of issues that will give them the 
highest return in votes.  
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Substance versus packaging  
Furthermore, party manifestos can be thought of as being written for two different audiences. 
According to Harmel, Janda and Tan’s Substance vs. Packaging: An Empirical Analysis of 
Parties’ Issue Profiles (1995), party manifestos are written for both an internal audience of 
members, activists, leaders, and representatives, and an external audience of voters and media. 
Harmel, Janda and Tan first distinguish between party issue changes of identity versus changes 
of image. Changes in party identity are felt by the party’s internal audience, while changes in 
party image are felt by the party’s external audience.  
 
Additionally, an election manifesto consists of both ‘content’ and ‘packaging’. The content of 
the platform is essentially the identity of the party, while the packaging of issues in the platform 
is the image of the party. The content of a manifesto speaks to the internal audience and the 
packaging of the manifesto speaks to the party’s external audience. It follows that “a given party 
identity can be packaged in many different ways—all equally acceptable to the membership, but 
not all equally inviting to the electorate” (Harmel, Janda & Tan 1995). Therefore, manifesto 
writers attempt to pick the best packaging for the issue content. According to Robertson’s 
salience theory, particular issue positions taken by a party, i.e. content, are unimportant to the 
electorate because “electors are not particularly concerned with the means adopted to solve the 
problems which oppress them but rather with the resolution of the problem along the lines they 
want” (Budge & Farlie 1977). In other words, voters are not concerned with how the social 
problem will be resolved, but instead that it will be resolved in a manner that they agree with. 
Therefore, while the electorate is unconcerned with the actual content of the platform, they are 
concerned with the packaging of the content, or, in other words, the amount within a platform 
	   9	  
allocated to the voter. As stated previously, a party who perceives that an election is competitive 
will pursue a broad distribution of policies in order to entice undecided voters to the party. 
Therefore, the party will generalize the policies in their political programs. While not changing 
the substance of their program, they do package the content of their program in a format that is 
the most appealing for the undecided voter.  
 
Aggregation versus articulation 
The existing literature generally takes for granted that Political parties function to educate, 
articulate, aggregate, and recruit support for governmental leaders. Aggregation refers generally 
to “the process of gathering, combining, and accommodating different interests into policies 
pressed upon the government” and specifically within the context of political parties, aggregation 
refers to the idea that parties bring together groups of people from all different issues or interests 
(Almond & Powell 1966). In other words, political aggregation is the extent to which a party 
draws its supporters evenly from all major social groups. Articulation, on the other hand, refers 
to a political party’s ability to take the interests of their supporters and package them in a way to 
deliver them to government.  
 
According to our theory, if the party is in government currently or has been in the past, it will 
pursue the aggregation strategy. The party will want to prove that it is committed to a broad 
range of issues in order to aggregate a large number of supporters. This subsumes that a party 
believes it has an opportunity to once again be in government. Therefore, the party perceives the 
election as competitive and will package the content of their program in a way that appeals to a 
broad range of voters. These more “institutionalized” parties have had more opportunity than 
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their younger counterparts to “formulate an agenda of specific policy objectives broad and deep 
enough to constitute a truly policy-oriented manifesto” (Harmel 2011: 16). Parties that are not or 
have not recently been in government will pursue the articulation strategy. They will want to 
articulate a few main issues in order to shore up and mobilize their parties’ support bases. 
Therefore, our formal hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis: Parties that are in government currently or have been in the recent past will pursue 
the strategy of aggregation when creating their manifestos, while those new to government or not 
in government in the recent past will pursue the articulation strategy when creating their 
manifestos.  
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CHAPTER III 
MEASUREMENT AND DATA 
 
Comparative Manifesto Project  
The primary research design of this thesis is the cross-sectional and cross-national analysis of 
political party manifestos. In order to measure the dependent variables of issue articulation and 
issue aggregation we have used the Comparative Manifestos Project data collected by the 
Manifestos Research Group. The objective of the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) is to 
measure policy positions of parties in any democratic election since World War II. Specifically, 
the CMP has focused on parties within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, the European Union, Central Europe, and Eastern Europe. The data are based on a 
quantitative content analysis of party manifestos for more than fifty countries covering all free 
democratic elections since 1945, wherein the Manifestos Research Group classified each 
sentence of each party program into one of fifty-six unique policy categories. The Manifestos 
Research Group has employed a two-step process for producing this data. First, the coders 
unitize the manifesto. This consists of cutting the manifesto into quasi-sentences, or in other 
words, coding units that contain exactly one issue statement. Second, the coders must assign the 
quasi-sentences to one of the fifty-six issue categories that are grouped in seven different policy 
areas. The CMP developed this coding category system with the intention that the codes can be 
comparable between parties, countries, elections, and across time.  
 
The data employed in this study consist of the percentage of sentences in a manifesto dedicated 
to each of the fifty-six issues in an individual case. The parties and their platforms included in 
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the Comparative Manifestos Project data constitute the cases researched. For analytical purposes 
the case is the party; however, for data collection purposes, the case is the party platform. The 
assumption of this study is that one can infer the strategy that a party is pursuing in a given 
platform based the Comparative Manifestos Project data. The percentage of sentences related to 
each of the fifty-six policy categories that comprise the manifesto will illustrate if the party to 
whom the respective manifesto belongs is concentrating on a few issues (articulation) or on a 
broad range of issues (aggregation).  
 
First, this study has used the Manifesto Project Dataset to determine the amount of variance that 
exists in the dependent variable. The CMP’s data are downloadable through the website 
www.manifesto-project.wzb.eu. IBM’s SPSS Statistics 22 has been employed for statistical 
analysis of the full Manifesto Project Dataset. In the case of some variables, the Manifesto 
Research Group has separated variables into a positive and a negative variable. For example, the 
variable Foreign Special Relationships has been coded in the Manifesto Project Database as 
Foreign Special Relationships: Positive for favorable mentions of countries with which the 
manifesto country already has or seeks a special relation with, and Foreign Special 
Relationships: Negative for negative mentions of countries with which the manifesto country has 
special relations with. As this study is concerned with a party’s aggregation and articulation of 
issues, positive and negative variables have been transformed into one “total variable” using 
SPSS statistics. The positive and negative variables of Foreign Special Relations, Military, 
Internationalism, European Community/Union, Constitutionalism, Protectionism, Welfare state, 
Education, National Way of Life, Traditional Morality, Multiculturalism, and Labour Groups 
were each transformed respectively into a new total-variable.  
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The total-variables were then combined with existing variables of the CMP dataset into seven 
composite issue categories: Non-Domestic1, Limiting Government2, Governance3, Economy4, 
Welfare and Quality of Life5, Scope of Government6, and Group Interest7. In order to condense 
the data into a manageable dataset, we have limited the scope of the study to established western 
European democracies and Anglo-American democracies excluding presidential systems. 
Therefore, the scope of the study has been limited to sixteen countries, all democracies as of the 
1950’s with no sustained period without democracy after that point. The cases include Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway.  
 
Parliament and government composition database 
Secondly, in order to determine my independent variable, party experience in government, we 
have used cross-national election data from the parliament and government composition database 
(ParlGov). The database stretches from the 1940’s to today and contains data on elections and 
governments for all EU and most OECD members. The goal of ParlGov is to successfully 
provide an infrastructure that includes information on government composition, election results 
and party positions. The database contains data on nearly 1400 parties, 680 elections with 5800 
election results. Additionally, the database includes 2300 cabinet parties and 960 governments. 
We have hypothesized that parties that are in government or have been in government in the 
recent past will pursue the strategy of issue aggregation within their manifesto, whereas parties 
that have not been in government will pursue the strategy of issue articulation. In order to 
measure a party’s involvement in government, this variable has been operationalized as whether 
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or not the party has been in government in the election prior to the writing of the platform or in 
the national election before that one. This means that in order to determine whether or not a party 
is aggregating or articulating issues in their manifesto, we have used ParlGov to determine 
whether the party in question held a cabinet position in one or two elections prior to the to the 
manifesto being studied (ingovt). We have operationalized whether or not a party has been in 
government in this way because although a party might not currently be in government they may 
still perceive themselves as competitive and therefore package their manifesto content in an 
aggregative manner. Additionally, ParlGov has been used to determine, for each party’s 
manifesto, when the last time that party was in government (lastyringovt) and whether the party 
has never or ever been in government (everingov). These three variables have been added to the 
SPSS CMP datasheet.  
 
Measurement  
The ParlGov data have been added to SPSS using the variable ingovt (in government last two 
cycles). This variable has been created using the country cabinet data from ParlGov. If the party 
has held a cabinet position within the previous two election cycles or within the last five years, 
they receive a code of 1.00 (yes). If the party has not been in government within previous two 
election cycles and has not been in government for the last five years, it receive a score of .00 
(no). For example, using the Social Democratic Party of Denmark’s (SD) manifesto written for 
the November 22nd, 1966 national parliamentary election, using the ParlGov’s database, we were 
able to determine that the SD party held a cabinet position after both the 1962 and 1964 national 
elections. Therefore, the SD manifesto for 1966 received a code of 1.00 because the party held a 
cabinet position within at least one of the previous two elections, or within the last five years.  
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It is important to note that Caretaker cabinets in government for a year or less were not included 
in the calculation of ingovt. 8 
 
Next, in order to determine aggregation and articulation of issues, a new variable in the SPSS 
dataset was generated. The dichotomous variable Aggart66 was generated to measure the 
manifesto’s that were aggregative and those that were articulative. In Aggart66, the articulative 
manifestos have been operationalized as those that devoted two-thirds or more of the manifesto 
content to one of the seven composite issue category variables. Aggart66 aggregative manifestos 
were operationalized as those spending less than or equal to twenty percent of their manifesto on 
any one of the seven composite issue category variables. A party spending less than twenty 
percent of their manifesto on any given category suggests that the party is attempting to address 
many different issues in order to appeal to a broad range of voters. The Aggart66 variable was 
produced in SPSS statistics. For Aggart66, articulative platforms were coded with a .00, 
aggregative platforms were coded with a 1.00, and manifestos that were neither aggregative nor 
articulative were coded with a 2.00. For Aggart66 an articulative manifesto would be one that 
66.67% or more of the manifesto was devoted to just one of the seven composite issue 
categories. For Aggart66 the aggregative manifesto is one where no more than 20.0 percent of 
the statements were devoted to any one of the seven composite issue categories.9 This process 
resulted in 105 aggregative manifestos and 26 articulative manifestos. Parties that fit neither of 
these “ideal type” categories were dropped from the data set for the remainder of these analyses.  
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The Aggart66 variable allows us to determine whether a specific party within a specific year has 
pursued a strategy of aggregation or articulation within their manifesto. Using this variable, an 
example of an aggregative manifesto would be the Danish Communist Party of Denmark’s 
manifesto of February, 1977.  This Danish Communist Party of Denmark’s manifesto spent no 
more than 14.40% of the manifesto on any one of the seven composite issue category variables. 
7.20% of the manifesto was dedicated to non-domestic issues, 1.80% on limiting government, 
1.80% on governance, 14.40% on economy, 12.60% on welfare and quality of life, .00% on 
scope of government, and 5.40% on group interest issues. An example of an articulative 
manifesto would be the Progressive Party of Iceland’s June, 1959 manifesto. This manifesto 
spent .00% on non-domestic, 3.70% on limiting government, 86.50% on governance, 4.90% on 
economy, 1.20% on welfare and quality of life, .00% on scope of government, and 2.40% on 
group interest issues.  
 
Therefore, the data for this study comes from both the Comparative Manifestos Project database 
and Parliament and government composition database. Using information from these two 
databases, we have built a new database suited for the needs of this study. This data includes 
manifesto data that has been coded into fifty-six different issues from national parties of sixteen 
countries ranging from the 1940’s to present. Additionally, these issue categories have been 
condensed into seven broad composite issue category variables. For each party, information such 
as whether they were in government within the previous two election cycles or the last five years 
has been added. Dichotomous variables for aggregative and articulative manifestos are also 
included.  
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYTICAL METHODS 
 
In order to test the hypothesized relationship between party experience and party strategies 
pursued in writing a manifesto, crosstabulation was performed. Crosstabulation was used to test 
the hypothesized relationship because of its ability to provide a basic picture of the interrelation 
between two variables. Specifically, using SPSS statistics a crosstabs two by two table, Aggart66 
by ingovt, was run. Only “ideal type” aggregation (1.00) and articulation (.00) cases were used in 
Aggart66. The third category, manifestos that were aggregative neither aggregative (1.00) nor 
articulative (2.00), was dropped from the crosstabulation because our theory does not address 
what occurs if a party pursues neither aggregation nor articulation. Therefore, the crosstabs table 
was two by two; whether the party was in government (1.00) or out if government (.00) and 
whether the party pursued aggregation (1.00) or articulation (.00). This allowed us to determine 
whether there was a relationship between a party’s participation in government and the strategies 
pursued in manifesto writing.  
 
According to our hypothesis, after running cross tabulation on the variables Aggart66 and ingovt, 
we expected to find that parties coded “in government” would pursue aggregative manifestos and 
parties coded “not in government” would pursue articulative manifestos. In order for the 
hypothesized relationship to be statistically significant, a chi square test was run in the cross 
tabulation. The Chi Square Test determined whether the hypothesized relationship was 
statistically significant at the .05 level using the one tailed test. In other words, for a relationship 
between variables to be significant at the .05 level means that less than five times out of one 
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hundred this relationship would have occurred by chance. Additionally, the one tailed test was 
used because our hypothesis was concerned not only with finding a relationship between our 
variables, but also the direction of the relationship between the variables.  
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CHAPTER V  
FINDINGS 
 
The hypothesized relationship of government participation and manifesto strategy was not 
supported. Interestingly, after running the crosstabulation command in SPSS, the column 
percentages show that there is a relationship between the variable ingovt and Aggart66.10 
However, the data supports the finding that there is a significant relationship in the opposite 
direction from that hypothesized, as demonstrated below in Table 1. For this study, in order for 
our hypothesis to hold, we expected to see that a higher percentage of Aggart66 manifestos 
coded .00 would not have been in government in the last two election cycles or five years and 
that a higher percentage of Aggart66 manifestos coded 1.00 would have been in government in 
the last two election cycles or five years. The column percentages demonstrate that the opposite 
relationship has occurred within our dataset. The crosstabulation shows that out of parties that 
have been in government recently 71.9% of these manifestos have been aggregative whereas out 
of parties that have not been in government recently 86.5% of these manifestos have been 
aggregative. Therefore, parties that have not been in government recently have been more likely 
to produce aggregative manifestos than those in government recently. Additionally the 
crosstabulation shows that out of parties that have been in government recently 28.1% of these 
manifestos have been articulative whereas out of parties that have not been in government 
recently only 13.5% of these manifestos have been articulative. These data suggest that parties in 
government recently are more likely to produce articulative manifestos than are parties that have 
not been in government recently.  
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Table 1. Articulative or Aggregative by In Government Last Two Cycles Crosstabulation 
 
 
Simply from looking at the crosstabulation table, a substantial difference was evident between 
the dependent variable percentages. A Chi-Square Test was run on the crosstabulation to 
determine whether there was a statistically significant relationship between the variables 
Aggart66 and ingovt. As seen in Table 2, the Chi-Square Test demonstrates that there is a 
statistically significant relationship between Aggart66 and ingovt, however in the opposite 
direction of our hypothesized relationship. The one-sided test revealed a .032 chance of this 
relationship occurring randomly. Therefore, the relationship is statistically significant at the .05 
level. 11 
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Table 2. Articulative or Aggregative by In Government Last Two Cycles Chi-Square Tests 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study has not supported our hypothesis. However, the testing of this hypothesis has 
interestingly revealed a statistically significant relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables in the opposite direction than was hypothesized. Our hypothesis relied on 
the thinking that parties use manifestos as a reflection on past experience. By this thinking, a 
party who has not been in government recently would use their platform to please their support 
base instead of broadening their platform to entice votes from a broad array of the population. 
Additionally by this thinking, a party who has been in government recently would use their 
manifesto to touch on a broad range of issues. However, our findings support the opposite, that a 
party not recently in government is more likely to pursue a strategy of issue aggregation than is a 
party recently in government. Additionally, a party recently in government is more likely to 
pursue a strategy of issue articulation than is a party not recently in government.  
From these findings it can be proposed that parties may not treat manifestos as a 
reflection of past actions, but instead use manifestos as a projection of future actions. Harmel and 
Svasand (1997) hypothesize that minor parties may influence major party’s identity by causing 
them to change their main social or ideological positions. Their study reasons that rather than 
reacting to actual electoral performance, a “party may have been (pro)acting to make its stable 
situation even better” (Harmel & Svasand 1997). Furthermore, Harmel and Svasand conclude 
their study by stating that parties can not only “see parties on two sides of them at once, but they 
can also presumably look to the future as well as the recent past” (Harmel & Svasand 1997). By 
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acting in response to a perceived future threat of a party either in or out of government, the party 
in government may be using their manifesto proactively rather than retroactively.  
Following this logic, parties who have never been in government or have not recently 
been in government may be seeking to gain many supporters in order to win enough votes to 
enter government. By this reasoning, these parties may seek issue aggregation rather than issue 
articulation. Furthermore, parties in government currently or in the recent past may have the 
luxury of solely addressing their support base. Their issue stances may be widely known and 
therefore may not need to be addressed within the manifesto. Following this logic, parties in 
government may instead pursue the strategy of issue articulation in their manifesto. So while 
parties are still using their platforms strategically, they are doing so differently from what we had 
originally hypothesized. Therefore, further study should be given to this newly discovered 
relationship between party experience and party platform strategy.   
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ENDNOTES 	  
1 The composite issue category Non Domestic was created by combining Foreign Special 
 
2 Using the same process to create the issue category variable Limiting Government, I combined 
variables Freedom and Human Rights, Democracy, and Constitutionalism total. 
 
3 The composite issue category variable Governance consists of the variables Federalism, 
Centralization, Governmental and Administrative Efficiency, Political Corruption and Political 
Authority.  
 
4 Economy consists of the variables Free Market Economy, Incentives, Market Regulation, 
Economic Planning, Corporatism/ Mixed Economy, Protectionism total, Economic Goals, 
Keynesian Demand Management, Economic Growth: Positive, Technology and Infrastructure, 
Controlled Economy, Nationalization, Economic Orthodoxy, Marxism Analysis: Positive, and 
Anti-Growth Economy: Positive. 
 
5 Welfare and Quality of Life consists of the variables Environmental Protection: Positive, 
Culture: Positive, Equality: Positive, Welfare State total, and Education total.  
 
6 Scope of Government consists of the variables National Way of Life total, Traditional Morality 
total, Law and Order: Positive, Civic Mindedness: Positive, and Multiculturalism total. 
 
7 The composite issue category Group Interest consists of the variables Labour Groups total, 
Agriculture and Farmers: Positive, Middle Class and Professional Groups, Underprivileged 
Minority Groups, and Non-economic Demographic Groups. 
 
8 Two additional variables were produced using ParlGov. The variable lastyringovt (last year in 
government) has also been produced using data from ParlGov. This variable looks at the election 
date for which the manifesto was written and determines the last time the party had been in 
government prior to the election date. For example, looking once again at the Social Democratic 
Party of Denmark’s manifesto written for the November 22nd, 1966 national parliamentary 
election, using ParlGov’s data we have determined that the last year the Social Democratic Party 
of Denmark was in government leading up to the 1966 national election was the previous year, 
1965 and therefore SD was given a code of 1965. We created a variable to determine whether or 
not the political party in question had ever been in government. This variable was named 
everingov (ever in government) and was produced using ParlGov’s data on country cabinet 
makeup. Political parties who had never been in government were coded .00 (never) and parties 
that had been in government at least some time in their lifespan were coded 1.00 (ever). If a 
political party’s only time in government was as a member of a caretaker cabinet, then they have 
been coded as never having been in government. 
 9	  To	  create	  Aggart	  66,	  Aggart66.0 was created to measure articulative manifestos that devoted 
sixty percent or more to a particular issue group. Aggart66.0 was generated by the command 	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“transform, compute variable, Aggart66.0=0 if (NonDomestic≥=66.67) or 
(LimitingGovernment≥=66.67) or (Governance≥=66.67) or (Economy≥=66.67) or 
(WelfareAndQualityOfLife≥=66.67) or (ScopeOfGovernment≥=66.67) or 
(GroupInterest≥=66.67)”. In order to produce the aggregative variable, Aggart66.1 was 
generated by the command “transform, compute variable, Aggart66.1=1 if (NonDomestic≤ 
=20.00) & (LimitingGovernment≤=20.00) & (Governance≤=20.00) & (Economy≤=20.00) & 
(WelfareAndQualityOfLife≤=20.00) & (ScopeOfGovernment≤=20.00) & 
(GroupInterest≤=20.00)”. This generates the dichotomous variable Aggart66. The same 
commands used to produce Aggart66.1 were used to produce the aggregative variable for 
Aggart60, however articulative manifestos were measured as those devoting 60.00% or more to 
one of the seven composite issue categories.  
 
10 We measured articulative manifestos at two different percentage levels to ensure the validity 
of this study. A slightly less restrictive variable, Aggart60 was generated as well. The only 
difference between Aggart60 and Aggart66 was what was considered to be an articulative 
platform. For Aggart60, the articulative platforms have been operationalized as those that 
devoted sixty percent of the manifesto or more to one of the seven composite issue categories. 
For both Aggart60 and Aggart66 the aggregative manifesto is one where no more than 20.0 
percent of the statements were devoted to any one of the seven composite issue categories. A 
crosstabulation table with a Chi Square test was run on Aggart60 as well. This test was 
significant at the .05 level.   
 11	  Some	  may	  wonder	  whether	  the	  inclusion	  of	  two-­‐party	  systems	  (Great	  Britain,	  Australia,	  and	  New	  Zealand	  until	  1996)	  would	  have	  significantly	  affected	  these	  results,	  given	  that	  all	  parties	  of	  two-­‐party	  systems,	  whether	  recently	  in	  government	  or	  not,	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  aggregative.	  Following	  the	  logic	  of	  Budge	  and	  Farlie	  1977,	  political	  parties	  “will	  be	  less	  partisan	  when	  they	  think	  the	  election	  is	  competitive,	  and	  more	  partisan	  when	  they	  consider	  themselves	  bound	  to	  win	  or	  lose”.	  Thus,	  in	  a	  two	  party	  system,	  both	  parties	  will	  pursue	  aggregation	  in	  order	  to	  collect	  more	  supporters	  than	  the	  other	  party,	  whereas	  in	  a	  multiparty	  system,	  both	  aggregation	  and	  articulation	  strategies	  will	  exist	  because	  the	  system	  allows	  for	  parties	  with	  a	  narrow	  focus	  and	  a	  small	  group	  of	  specific	  supporters	  to	  gain	  parliamentary	  office.	  However,	  our	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  two-­‐party	  systems	  reveal	  no	  special	  tendency	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  be	  aggregative.	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